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Abstract
We show that macroeconomic movements have strong effects on the
happiness of nations.  First, we find that there are clear microeconomic
patterns in the psychological well-being levels of a quarter of a million
randomly sampled Europeans and Americans from the 1970's to the
1990's. Happiness equations are monotonically increasing in income,
and have a similar structure in different countries.  Second, movements
in reported well-being are correlated with changes in macroeconomic
variables such as Gross Domestic Product.   This holds true after
controlling for the personal characteristics of respondents, country
fixed-effects, year dummies, and country-specific time trends.  Third,
the paper establishes that recessions create psychic losses that extend
beyond the fall in GDP and rise in the number of people unemployed.
These losses are large.  Fourth, the welfare state appears to be a
compensating force: higher unemployment benefits are associated with
higher national well-being.
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1I. Introduction
Newspapers regularly report changes in macroeconomic variables.  It is also known that
economic variables predict voters’ actions and political outcomes (Frey and Schneider
(1978)).  These facts suggest that aggregate economic forces matter to people.  Yet
comparatively little is known empirically about how human well-being is influenced by
macroeconomic fluctuations.1  When asked to evaluate the cost of a business cycle
downturn, most economists measure the small drop in Gross Domestic Product.
This paper adopts a different approach.  It begins with international data on the
reported well-being levels of hundreds of thousands of individuals.  The paper’s first
finding is that there are strong microeconomic patterns in the data, and that these patterns
are similar in a number of countries.  Happiness data behave in a predictable way.  We
then show that, after controlling for the characteristics of people and countries,
macroeconomic forces have marked and statistically robust effects on reported well-
being.  GDP affects a country’s happiness.  Furthermore, pure psychic costs from
recessions appear to be large.  As well as the losses from a fall in GDP, and the direct
costs of recession to those falling unemployed, a typical business cycle downturn of one
year’s length would have to be ‘compensated’ by giving each citizen – not just
unemployed citizens – approximately $200 per year.2  This loss is over and above the
GDP cost of a year of recession.  It is an indirect or ‘fear’ effect that is omitted from
economists’ standard calculations of the cost of cyclical downturns.
In spite of a long tradition studying aggregate economic fluctuations, there is
disagreement among economists about the seriousness of their effects.  One view,
associated with Keynes, argues that recessions are expensive disruptions to the economic
organisation of society.  Recessions involve considerable losses – under-utilisation of
invested capacity, emotional costs to those who lose their jobs, and distributional
unfairness.  A different view is adopted by real-business-cycle theorists.  They argue that
Keynesians overestimate the costs of business cycles: downturns follow booms and
business cycles do not affect the average level of economic activity.  Given that
                                                          
1 It is known that suicide rose markedly in the Great Depression, but that was probably too
extreme an episode to allow any easy judgement.
2individuals are optimising, recessions are desirable adjustments to productivity shocks.
This means that the costs of business cycles are small – perhaps only 0.1 percent of total
consumption in the US (Lucas (1987)).3  Consequently, these economists have turned
their attention to economic growth and away from fluctuations.
Our paper derives a measure of the costs of an economic downturn that can be
used in such debates.  In doing so, the paper employs data of a kind more commonly
found in the psychology literature.  Collected in standard economic and social surveys,
the data provide self-reported measures of well-being, such as responses to questions
about how happy and satisfied individual respondents are with their lives.  We begin by
showing that life-satisfaction regression equations – where individuals’ subjective well-
being levels are regressed on the personal characteristics of the respondents – have a
broadly common structure across countries.  A large set of personal characteristics has
approximately the same influence on reported happiness, regardless of where well-being
questions are being asked.  This regularity suggests that happiness data contain
potentially interesting information.
II.  Conceptual Issues
From the outset, the paper has to face up to two conceptual concerns. The first is caused
by the approximately untrended nature of reported happiness (as noted by Richard
Easterlin (1974)).  For the usual unit-root reasons, we cannot then regress happiness on
trended variables such as Gross Domestic Product.  The paper experiments with
equations in which there are (i) year dummies, (ii) country-specific time trends, and (iii)
change-in-GDP variables.  The second conceptual problem is that variables such as GDP
per capita, unemployment and inflation are not exogenous.  These variables are
influenced by politicians’ choices; their choices are shaped by re-election probabilities;
those probabilities in turn can depend on the feeling of contentment among a country’s
citizens.  A further possible source of simultaneity is that happier people may work
                                                                                                                                                                            
2 In 1985 US dollars, which is the middle of our sample.
3 Even when market imperfections are introduced, the costs rise by only a factor of five, and they
are significantly lower if borrowing is allowed: see Atkeson and Phelan (1994). A different
3harder and thus produce more output.  It is not straightforward to find believable
macroeconomic instruments that can identify the well-being equation.  Instead, the paper
experiments with different forms of lag structures, to attempt to see if movements in
macroeconomic forces lead, later on, to movements in well-being.
Traditionally, economists assume that it is sufficient to pay attention to decisions.
This is because people’s choices should reveal their preferences.  More recently,
however, it has been suggested that an alternative is to focus on experienced utility, a
concept that emphasises the pleasures derived from consumption (e.g. Kahneman and
Thaler (1991)).  Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) provide an axiomatic defence of
experienced utility with applications to economics.  We make the assumption that survey
measures of happiness are closer to experienced utility than to the decision utility of
standard economic theory. Although a number of conceptual questions remain
unanswered (for example, with respect to how people are affected by comparisons and
reference points), it has been argued by some that self-reports of satisfaction may help
deal with the challenges posed by the need to understand experienced utility (see Rabin
(1998), for instance).
There has been comparatively little research by economists on reported well-
being data.  Richard Easterlin (1974) began what remains a small literature, and recently
updated his work in Easterlin (1995).  Other contributions include Ng (1996, 1997),
Blanchflower and Oswald (1999), Frank (1985), Inglehart (1990), Fox and Kahneman
(1992), Frey and Stutzer (2000), Konow and Earley (1999), Oswald (1997), Winkelmann
and Winkelmann (1998), and Morawetz et al (1977).  Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald
(2001) study people’s preferences between inflation and unemployment.  Di Tella and
MacCulloch (1999) use happiness data to examine the properties of partisan versus
opportunistic voting models.
The paper’s main data source is the Euro-Barometer Survey Series.  Partly the
creation of Ronald Inglehart at the University of Michigan, the surveys record happiness
and life-satisfaction scores on approximately 300,000 people living in twelve European
countries over the period 1975 to 1992.  We also use the United States General Social
                                                                                                                                                                            
approach to measuring the costs of business cycles using asset prices is developed in Alvarez and
Jermann (1999).
4Survey.  It records similar kinds of information on approximately 30,000 individuals over
the period 1972-94.  Section III introduces our happiness data and studies how they are
affected by personal characteristics.
It is well-known that individuals’ answers to well-being questions can be
influenced by order and framing effects within a survey, and by the number of available
answer categories (in our main data set, there are only four).  Apart from the pragmatic
defense that we are constrained by the data as collected, some of these problems can be
reduced by averaging across large numbers of observations, and by the inclusion of
country fixed-effects in the macroeconomic regressions. Section IV describes our
empirical strategy.
Section V studies the relationship between well-being data and national income
per-capita.  The survey questions do not ask people whether they like economic booms.
Instead, respondents are asked how happy they feel with their lives, and their collective
answers can be shown – unknown to the respondents themselves – to move systematically
with their nation’s GDP.4 In section VI we calculate the effect of other macroeconomic
variables, such as the unemployment rate, on happiness. We then use these results to
calculate the costs of recessions.
Section VII studies what happens to reported happiness when governments try to
reduce the impact of economic fluctuations.  The focus here is on the welfare state, and
especially on the impact upon well-being of an unemployment benefit system.  We show
that countries with more generous benefit systems are happier (or, more strictly speaking,
say that they are happier).  Some economists who study European unemployment have
claimed a causal link between the region’s relatively generous welfare provision and its
unemployment problems.  By making life too easy for the unemployed, the argument
goes, the welfare states of Europe have taken away the incentive to work and so fostered
voluntary joblessness.  We test, and fail to find evidence for, this common supposition.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the gap in happiness between the employed and the
                                                          
4 Thus, our approach differs from that of Shiller (1996), Di Tella and MacCulloch (1996b), Boeri,
Borsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001), Luttmer (2001) and MacCulloch (2002), who use survey data
directly related to the issue being studied (inflation, unemployment benefits, welfare state reform,
redistribution and revolutions, respectively).
5unemployed has stayed the same since the 1970s.  It has apparently not become easier,
over the decades, to be out of work in Europe.
Section VIII summarizes.
III.  Happiness Data and Microeconometric Patterns
A random sample of Europeans is interviewed each year and asked two questions, among
others, that are of interest here.  The first is "Taking all things together, how would you
say things are these days – would you say you're very happy, fairly happy, or not too
happy these days?" (small "Don't know" and "No answer" categories are not studied
here).  The surveys also report the answers of 271,224 individuals across 18 years to a
“life satisfaction” question.  This question is included in part because the word happy
translates imprecisely across languages.  It asks, "On the whole, are you very satisfied,
fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?” (The small
"Don't know" and "No answer" categories are again not studied).
Raw well-being data are presented in Table 1.  We focus principally on life
satisfaction data because they are available for a longer period of time – from 1975 to
1992 instead of just 1975-86.  Happiness and life satisfaction are correlated (the
correlation coefficient is 0.56 for the period 1975-86).  Blanchflower and Oswald (1999)
have shown that where British data on both are available the microeconometric equations
have almost identical forms.  Our paper finds, in a later table, the same for Europe. The
Appendix presents summary statistics, describes the data sets, gives equations
individually for nations, and explains how our later macroeconomic variables are
measured.  Table 1a provides a cross-tabulation of life satisfaction for Europe.
The analysis also examines well-being data from the United States General Social
Survey (1972-1994).  There is a similar happiness question that reads "Taken all together,
how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty
happy, or not too happy?” (Small "Don't know" and "No answer" categories are not
studied in this paper).  This was asked in each of 23 years and covers 26,668 individuals.
There was no life satisfaction question for the U.S.  Table 1b summarizes the happiness
responses for the United States.  With only three response categories, this question may
6be less revealing than the life question satisfaction that offers four.  An odd number of
categories may allow less introspection since people can choose the middle category
when unsure of their choice.
Taking at face value the numbers in the two halves of Table 1, well-being scores
appear to be skewed towards the top of the possible answer distribution.  In other words,
individuals seem to answer optimistically.  On average they say that they are relatively
happy and satisfied.  Whatever the appropriate interpretation of this pattern, it is clear that
in both Europe and the United States the unemployed and divorced are much less content.
These events are two of the largest negatives in life.  Marriage and high income, by
contrast, are associated with high well-being scores.  These are two of the largest
positives.  Women give fractionally higher well-being answers than men.
To consider the case for happiness regression equations, are there good reasons
why economists should use subjective well-being data in formal analysis?
One is a market-based argument: people who study mental health and happiness
for a living (psychologists) use such data.  There are thousands of papers that do so in
psychology and other social-science journals.  Unless economists believe they know
more about human psychology than psychologists, there is a case for considering how
such survey information can inform the discipline of economics.  A second argument is
that the data pass so-called validation exercises.  For example, Pavot et al (1991)
establishes experimentally that people who report themselves as happy tend to smile
more.5  Diener (1984) shows that people who say they are happy are independently rated
by those around them as happy individuals.  Konow and Earley (1999) describe other
ways in which subjective well-being data have been validated.  Self-reported measures of
well-being are also correlated with physiological responses and electrical readings in the
brain (for example, Sutton and Davidson (1997)).  Another of the checks is that, as
explained, different measures of self-reported well-being seem to exhibit high
correlations with one another.  Third, we regressed suicide rates on country-by-year
average reported happiness, using the same panel of countries used later in the paper.  We
controlled for year dummies and country fixed-effects, and corrected for
heteroscedasticity using White's method.  Consistent with the hypothesis that well-being
                                                          
5 See also Myers (1993).
7data contain useful information, the regression evidence revealed that higher levels of
national reported well-being are associated with lower national suicide rates (statistically
significant at the 6 per cent level).  Last, we obtained an approximate measure of
consistency by comparing the structure of happiness responses across countries.
A single individual’s answers on a well-being questionnaire are unlikely to be
reliable: there is no natural scaling to allow cross-person comparison of terms like
‘happy’ or ‘satisfied’.  However, in a well-being regression equation that uses large
samples, this difficulty is less acute.  In some settings, measurement error does little harm
in a dependent variable (though well-being variables would be less easy to use as
independent variables).
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present micro-econometric well-being equations for Europe and
the U.S.  Because of data limitations, Table 3 cannot be estimated over the full set of
years.
The equations of Tables 2-4 include a dummy for the year when the survey was
carried out (and, in the case of the Europe-wide data, for the country where the
respondent lives).  Two features stand out.  One is that – comparing for example Table 3
with Table 4 – approximately the same personal characteristics are statistically associated
with happiness in Europe and in the U.S.  Another, on closer examination, is that the
sizes of the effects do not vary dramatically between the two sides of the Atlantic.  For
example, the consequences of employment status, being a widow and of income appear to
be similar in the U.S. and Europe.  The effect of unemployment is always large: it is
equivalent to dropping from the top to the bottom income quartile.  Similar results obtain
if we examine the individual nations within Europe (in the Appendix). The regression
evidence here is consistent with the idea that unemployment is a major economic source
of human distress (as in the psychiatric stress data of Clark and Oswald (1994)).  More
generally, independent of the country where the respondent lives, the same personal
characteristics appear to be correlates with reported happiness.  Having family income
classified within a higher income quartile increases the likelihood that a respondent says
he or she is satisfied with life.  This effect is monotonic.  To an economist, it is
reminiscent of the utility function of standard economics.  A strong life-cycle pattern in
well-being also emerges.  In every country in our sample, happiness is U-shaped in age.
8IV.  Empirical Strategy
In order to estimate the costs of aggregate economic fluctuations, we start by evaluating
the role of national income per capita (GDP) in affecting individuals’ reported happiness.
A fundamental issue is the potential role of reference groups, that is, the possibility that
individuals care about their position relative to others in society and not just about the
absolute level of income (see, for example, Easterlin (1974), Diener (1984), Frank
(1985), Fox and Khaneman (1992), inter alia).  Hence we estimate a regression that
controls for, first, the income quartile to which the respondent's family belongs and,
second, also the average income per-capita in the country.  A key parameter of interest is
the coefficient on GDP in a happiness regression equation of the form
jittijititjit PersonalGDPHAPPY µλεα +++Σ+= (1)
where HAPPYjit is the well-being level reported by individual j, in country i in year t,  and
GDPit is gross domestic product per capita in that country (measured in constant 1985
dollars). Personaljit is a vector of personal characteristics of the respondents, which
include income quartile, gender, marital status, education, whether employed or
unemployed, age and number of children.6  In some specifications, country-specific time
trends are also added. Because many of the personal variables are potentially
endogenous, a later section of the paper checks alternative econometric specifications in
which only exogenous variables, such as age and gender, are used as microeconomic
controls.  The data set does not contain the person’s income, only the quartile of the
income distribution within which it lies.
We also include a country fixed-effect εi, and a year fixed-effect λt.  The first
captures unchanging cultural and institutional influences on reported happiness within
nations, and the second any global shocks that are common to all countries in each year.
The data are made up of a series of cross sections, so no individual person-specific effects
                                                          
6  An alternative two-step procedure that allows the coefficients on personal characteristics to
vary across countries is explained in our working paper.  Results are available upon request.
9can be included.  The categorical nature of the data is dealt with by the use of an ordered
probit model.  To obtain the correct standard errors, an adjustment is made for the fact
that the level of aggregation of the left-hand variable, happiness, is different than the
right-hand macroeconomic variables.7
Easterlin (1974) points out that happiness data appear to be untrended over time.
By contrast, nations grow richer over the years, so income per capita is trended.  Hence,
if happiness is a stationary variable, and the equation is wrongly specified, then α in a
simple regression equation is likely, for standard reasons, to be biased towards zero.8  In
that case, a potential solution is to focus on the growth rate of GDP or to study
macroeconomic variables measured relative to trend.
We explore this issue.  The paper includes time dummies for the panel of
countries, studies different lengths of lag, and experiments with a simple distributed lag
structure. We also include country-specific time trends (along with the year and country
fixed-effects) and change-in-GDP variables. These issues are not simply technical ones.
The economics of the problem suggests that we should allow for the presence of
adaptation effects, whereby, other things equal, high levels of income in the past might
fail to produce large effects on happiness because they lead to higher aspirations and
altered comparisons.  This is related to a particularly important question.  Does higher
GDP have permanent effects on a nation’s well-being?  Conventional economics assumes
that it does.  The inherited wisdom in this field, due to Richard Easterlin and others, is
that it may not and that a concern for relative income is what could explain the untrended
nature of happiness survey responses (see Easterlin (1974), Blanchflower and Oswald
(1999), inter alia).  Another possibility is that GDP does buy extra happiness, but that
other factors have gradually been worsening in industrial societies through the decades,
and these declines have offset the benefits from extra real income.  If so, it might be
possible to make compatible the idea that GDP buys happiness with the fact that well-
being survey data do not trend upwards.  A panel approach, with country and year
dummies and country specific time trends, would then provide an appropriate testing
                                                          
7 See Moulton (1986) for a discussion of the necessary correction to the standard errors.
8 Easterlin (1974) made this observation looking at US data. This is not the norm, however, in our
sample of 12 European countries. For more on the specific country trends, the reader is referred to
our working paper.
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ground.  Furthermore, controlling for the income quartiles to which individuals belong to
in our regressions provides some reassurance that the results on aggregate income do not
just reflect concerns for relative income (with the reference group based on the whole
economy).
If income per capita can be shown to affect happiness, a regression designed to
value other macroeconomic influences can be estimated. This has the following form
jittijititititjit PersonalMacroUnempGDPHAPPY µλεβα +++Σ+Θ++= (2)
where Unempit is the unemployment rate in country i in year t, and Macroit is a vector of
other macroeconomic variables that may influence well-being. Macroit includes
Inflationit, the rate of change of consumer prices in country i and year t, and Benefitit, the
generosity of the unemployment benefit system, which is here defined as the income
replacement rate.  To explore possible problems of simultaneity, in some equations we
use only personal controls that are exogenous (such as gender and age) and study
macroeconomic variables measured with a time lag.
In most regression equations, this paper’s specifications include as a regressor a
personal variable for whether the individual is unemployed.  That enables us, because we
are then controlling for the personal cost of joblessness, to test for any extra losses from
recessions – including economy-wide indirect psychic losses of a kind normally ignored
by economists.  As the effect of the business cycle on personal unemployment is thus
controlled for within the microeconomic regressors, a correction has to be done later,
when the whole cost of a recession is being calculated, to add back into the calculation
those personal costs.  In other words, an increase in joblessness can affect well-being
through at least two channels.  One is the direct effect: some people become unhappy
because they lose their jobs.  The second is that, perhaps because of fear, a rise in the
unemployment rate may reduce well-being even among those who are in work or looking
after the home.  To calculate the full losses from a recession, these two effects have to be
added together.
The paper also examines the way that governments have tried to alleviate the
costs of business-cycle downturns.  It has often been argued that the European welfare
11
state has allowed life to become too easy for the jobless -- and thus made recessions more
lasting. The phenomenon of structural unemployment in Europe is routinely blamed on
the continent’s welfare system.  To test this hypothesis in a new way, we use well-being
data.  The paper restricts the sample to those individuals who are either employed or
unemployed (thus excluding the retired, those keeping home and those attending school).
A regression of the following form is then estimated:
+++Σ+Ω+= tijitititjit PersonalMacroBBenefitHAPPY λεδ
jitjittijititit DunemPersonalMacroBBenefit µτθρπψ ++++++ *)(
where Dunemjit is a dummy taking the value 1 if respondent j is unemployed and zero
otherwise.  Personaljit is the same vector of personal characteristics defined above (which
includes Dunemjit) and MacroBit is a vector of macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita,
inflation rate and unemployment rate).  Our interest is the value of , which is the
interaction effect of benefits on the happiness ‘gap’.  The gap is the difference in well-
being between employed people and unemployed people.
The size of different variables’ effects on well-being is of interest.  An intuitive
way to think of what the coefficients mean in an ordered probit is, unfortunately, not
straightforward.  However, the formula for a calculation is as follows.  In our main
regression equations there are three cut points: call them a, b and c. If a person’s
happiness score (measured in ‘utils’) is equal to H, then the chance that she will declare
herself "very happy" (the top category) is: Prob("very happy") = F(H-c) where F(.) is the
standard cumulative normal distribution.9 If for example, H = c, then F(0) = 0.5 (or, in
other words, a 50 percent chance).  To interpret the coefficients, therefore, if a change in
an explanatory variable leads to a ∆H change in one’s happiness score, the change in the
probability of calling oneself "very happy" will go up by: ∆ Prob ("very happy") = F(H +
∆H - c) - F(H-c).
As background, Table 5a sets out the means and standard deviations for the
macroeconomic variables and Table 5b contains correlation coefficients.
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V. The Effect of GDP on Happiness
The first hypothesis to be tested is whether macroeconomic movements feed through into
people’s feelings of well-being.  A second task is to calculate the size of any effects.  In
order to put a value on recessions and booms, the paper compares the marginal effect of
income on happiness with the marginal effect of an unemployment upturn on happiness.
In other words, it calculates the marginal rate of substitution between GDP and
unemployment.
Recessions mean there are losses in real output, and higher levels of joblessness.
By exploiting well-being data, it is possible to test for additional costs.  We find that there
is evidence for what appear to be important psychic losses that are usually ignored in
economic models.
Table 6 presents simple specifications for happiness equations in which
macroeconomic influences are allowed to enter.  It focuses on GDP, and, for
transparency, examines a variety of lag lengths.  Column 1 of Table 6 regresses reported
well-being on the set of personal characteristics of the respondent and on the country’s
current level of GDP per capita.  The GDP variable enters with a coefficient of 1.1 and a
standard error of 0.34 (where GDP here has been scaled in the regressions by a factor of
10,000).  The data cover a dozen nations from 1975 to 1992.  To control for country and
year effects, dummies for these are included.  Since we are controlling in column 1 of
Table 6 for the quartile to which the respondent's family income belongs, the coefficient
on GDP reflects the effect of an absolute increase in national income on individual
happiness while keeping constant the relative position of the respondent.  There is
evidence of a positive and well-determined effect of GDP per capita on individuals’
perceived well-being.  An extra $1,000 in GDP per capita (in 1985 dollars) has
systematic and non-negligible consequences.10  It can be shown that it raises the
proportion of people in the top happiness category (“very satisfied” with their lives) by
                                                                                                                                                                            
9 More formally, a person’s “happiness score” is the predicted value of the underlying continuous
variable from the ordered probit regression given their observed personal characteristics.
10 Dollars of 2001 equal 1985 dollars multiplied by approximately 1.6. Hence we are considering
a rise of $ 1,600 when expressed in 2001 values.
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approximately 3.6 percentage points, which takes this category from 27.3% to 30.9%.11 It
lowers the proportion in the bottom category (“not at all satisfied” with life) by 0.7
percentage points, from 4.8% to 4.1%.12  In these data, contemporaneous happiness and
GDP are strongly correlated.
To begin to understand dynamics, and to check robustness, Columns 2 and 3 of
Table 6 give equivalent results when lagged levels of GDP are used.  Going back one
year makes little difference: the coefficient on lagged national income per capita in a
well-being equation is only slightly reduced.  Column 2 of Table 6 thus continues to find
a well-determined GDP effect.  Things weaken in column 3, which goes back to a two
year lag of GDP; but the coefficient remains positive, with a t-statistic of approximately
1.7.  Year dummies (not reported) enter significantly.  They are trended down over the
period, so some general force, common to these European nations, is acting to reduce
people’s feelings of happiness.  Our paper will not attempt to uncover what it might be,
but this remains a potentially important topic for future research.
It might be argued that, despite the inclusion of the year dummies, the mix of an
I(0) happiness variable with an I(1) GDP regressor still provides an unpersuasive
estimator for the effect of national income on well-being. There seem to be two potential
solutions. The first is to shift focus entirely to the growth rate in income.  As an
intermediate step, that helps assess how restrictive this shift might be, we include in
column 4 of Table 6 a set of variables for GDP per capita current, lagged once and lagged
twice (this is, of course, an unrestricted version of entering the level of GDP and its
change).  As might be expected, the GDP terms in column 4 of Table 6 are then
individually insignificantly different from zero. Nevertheless, solving out for the implied
long run equation, the steady-state coefficient on GDP per capita is positive and similar in
absolute value (equality cannot be rejected) to the coefficient on GDP per capita in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.  This point-estimate is inconsistent with the idea of complete
                                                          
11 This is calculated as follows: the average predicted happiness score, H, for the column 1
regression equals 1.16. A $1000 rise in GDP per capita increases the predicted happiness score by
∆H = 0.00011*1000 = 0.11. The top cut point, c = 1.84. Hence ∆ Prob(“very satisfied”) =
F(1.16+0.11-1.84) - F(1.16-1.84) = 0.284 - 0.248 = 0.036. Similar calculations can be done to
find a confidence interval for this point estimate (where one standard error below and above the
GDP coefficient equals 0.8 and 1.4, respectively). The interval is (0.025, 0.048).
12 Since ∆ Prob(“Not at all satisfied”) = F(-0.70-(1.16+0.11)) - F(-0.70-1.16) = 0.024 - 0.031 =
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adaptation – the idea that individuals entirely adjust to their income levels after a while
and only derive happiness from increases in income – although the standard errors
themselves in column 4 are large.
Columns (5) and (6) turn attention to growth in national income, ∆GDP per capita
and ∆GDP per capita (-1).  These are defined, respectively, for one lag and two lags
(where the former measures GDP minus GDP(-1) and the latter measures GDP(-1) minus
GDP(-2)).  The latter, ∆GDP per capita (-1), in column 6 of Table 6, is positive, well
defined, and economically important in size.  Hence there is evidence in our data that
bursts of GDP produce temporarily higher happiness.  Those sympathetic to the Easterlin
hypothesis can find support in column 6 of Table 6.
Another check is to include country-specific time trends. We do this – repeating
the earlier analysis of Table 6 to allow an exact comparison – in Table 7. Here the set of
personal characteristics has been estimated in the same (one-step) way as in Table 6, with
extremely similar coefficients, so those personal coefficients are not reported individually
in the tables. Other specification changes, such as using log GDP, do not change the main
results of our paper.
The results are again supportive of the idea that increases in national income are
associated with higher reported happiness.  Column 1 of Table 7 shows that the current
level of GDP per capita enters with a similar coefficient to the specification without
country-specific trends.  However, in columns 2 and 3, lagged GDP levels are now
weaker than before, with one sign reversing itself.  In column 4 of Table 7, all three of the
GDP terms are again entered together.  In this case the steady-state coefficient is poorly
determined and now numerically close to zero.  By contrast, in columns 5 and 6, the
change-in-GDP variables work even more strongly than in Table 6.
We draw the conclusion that there is evidence in these data for the existence of
both level and change effects on nations’ happiness.  First, consistent with standard
economic theory, it appears that well-being is robustly correlated, in a variety of settings,
with the level of current GDP.  As far as we know, this is the first empirical finding of its
kind.  Second, reported well-being is also correlated with growth in GDP, and this result
                                                                                                                                                                            
 -0.007, where the bottom cut-point, a = -0.70.
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is consistent with adaptation theories in which the benefits of real income wear off over
time.  Finally, lagged levels of GDP are statistically significant in certain specifications.
To go decisively beyond these conclusions, and to try to say whether it is level
effects or change effects that dominate the data, will probably require longer runs of data
than available to us.13  Our conjecture is that there is strong adaptation, so that human
beings get used to a rise in national income, but that not all of the benefits of riches
dissipate over time.  Hence GDP matters, even in the long run, but there are strong delta-
GDP effects in the short run.  Whether that conjecture will survive future research
remains to be seen.
VI.  Costs of Recessions
Having established that income is correlated with happiness, we turn to other
macroeconomic variables to see if their inclusion removes the correlation between
happiness and GDP.  It does not. Table 8, for example, repeats the previous analysis, and
incorporates also the rate of unemployment, the inflation rate, and an indicator of the
generosity of the welfare state.  Column (1) in Table 8 demonstrates that the macro
variables enter with what might be thought the expected signs.  All are statistically
significant at normal confidence levels.
How costly are recessions?  It can be shown that there are large losses over and
above a GDP decline and rise in personal unemployment.  To demonstrate this, we use a
slightly unusual welfare measure.
To explore economic significance, we take as a yardstick a downturn that is equal
to an increase in the unemployment rate of 1.5 percentage points.  The number 1.5 was
chosen by taking the average of the eleven full business cycles in the US since the
Second World War, and dividing by two to get the average unemployment deviation.  It
is then possible to calculate, from the coefficients in column 1 of Table 8, the marginal
rate of substitution between GDP per capita and unemployment.  Pure psychic losses can
                                                          
13 As a start in this direction we included a level term in regression (5) in Table 6. The coefficient
on GDP per capita is 1.057 (standard error=0.356), while that on ∆GDP per capita equals 0.429
(s.e.=0.757), so in this specification the level effect dominates. Including country specific time
trends brings the coefficients closer in terms of size and significance.
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then be estimated. The ratio of the two coefficients implies that, to keep their life-
satisfaction constant, individuals in these economies would have to be given, on top of
compensation for the direct GDP decline, extra compensation per year of approximately
200 dollars each (where this number is 0.015 times 1.91/0.00014).14  Measured in 2001
dollars it equals 330.  This would have to be paid to the average citizen, not just to those
losing their jobs.  Such a calculation makes the implicit assumption that, over the relevant
range, utility is linear, so that the margin is equal to the average.  This seems justifiable
for normal recessions, where national income changes by only a few per cent, but it might
not for a major slump in which national income fell dramatically.
Column (6) in Table 8 allows us to make these calculations using the growth rate
in GDP per capita.  The estimated coefficients indicate that the average person (employed
or unemployed) would experience no change in well being if, in the event of a business
downturn which increased the rate of unemployment by 1.5 percentage points, his/her
income were to be increased by approximately 3%.15
Such calculations underestimate the full cost to society of a rise in joblessness.
The reason for the underestimation is that these regressions hold constant the personal
cost of being unemployed (as a microeconomic regressor).  It can be calculated from
column (1) in Table 8 that an increase in the unemployment rate from 0 percent to 1.5
percent would have a ‘utils’ cost – for want of a better term – equal to approximately
0.029 (which is derived from 1.91 times 0.015).  This is for the average citizen, whether
employed or unemployed.  On the other hand, a person who becomes unemployed
experiences an actual loss (in utils) equal to 0.5.  This number comes from the coefficient
on being unemployed in column (1) in Table 8 (which is unreported but is similar to
those given in Table 6). The full social cost of an increase of 1.5 percentage points in the
unemployment rate in well-being units is therefore the sum of two components: it is (0.5
                                                          
14 This number, of course, has a standard error attached. The number 0.015 comes from the
assumption that a typical economic downturn adds 1.5 percentage points to unemployment.  The
number 1.91 is the coefficient on Unemployment rate in Table 8, column 1.  The number 0.00014
comes from the coefficient of 1.4 on GDP in column 1 of Table 8, after re-scaling back by a
factor of 10,000.
15 Since 0.015*1.95/0.000118 = 248 dollars which represents 3.2 per cent of the average level of
GDP per capita across the nations and years in the sample (= 248/7809).
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times 0.015) + (1.91 times 0.015) = 0.0075 + 0.029 = 0.036.16  Measured in dollars this is
equal to approximately $260 (where this number is 0.036/0.00014).  For an individual
who loses her job during the recession the actual loss is approximately $3,800 (where this
number equals (0.5 + 0.029)/0.00014).
The regressions in Table 8 establish that high unemployment in the economy is
unpleasant even for people who are employed.  One possibility is that this is some form
of fear-of-unemployment effect (see for instance Blanchflower (1991)).  There may also
be a – presumably fairly small – taxation effect, because if unemployment goes up the
population at large have to pay more tax to fund the increased bill for unemployment
benefits.  The indirect effects, when added to the direct ones on those who actually lose
their jobs, amount to a substantial well-being cost.  This stands in contrast to the view
that unemployment involves layoffs with short and relatively painless jobless spells.  The
ex-post effect on someone who actually loses his or her job is 20 times larger than the
effect on those who still have a job.  The indirect ‘fear’ losses are even larger, in
aggregate, because they affect more people.
The large well-being cost of losing a job shows why a rise in a nation’s
unemployment might frighten workers.  Becoming unemployed is much worse than is
implied by the drop in income alone.  The economist’s standard method of judging the
disutility from being laid off focuses on pecuniary losses.  According to our calculations,
that is a mistake, because it understates the full well-being costs, which, according to the
data, appear to be predominantly non-pecuniary.
The coefficients in Table 8 also allow us to put a value on the cost of inflation by
comparing the marginal effect of income on happiness with the marginal effect of an
inflation upturn on happiness. In other words, we can also calculate the marginal rate of
substitution between GDP and inflation. Using the ratio of the two coefficients on GDP
per capita and the Inflation Rate in column 1 implies that, to keep their life-satisfaction
                                                          
16 The following calculations may help clarify this. Call total welfare in society W= (1-u) E + u
V, where u is the unemployment rate and E and V are the utility of being employed and
unemployed respectively. The function, E, is defined over net income (because it includes taxes),
inflation and unemployment and the function, V, is defined over benefits, unemployment and
inflation. Then dW/du= (1-u) dE/du + u dV/du - (E-U). The expressions, dE/du and dV/du, can be
thought of as a fear of unemployment effect for the employed and the unemployed respectively.
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constant, an individual would have to be given compensation of approximately 70 dollars
for each 1 percentage point rise in inflation (where this number is 0.01 times
0.99/0.00014).
Simultaneity and Other Tests
Happiness, personal characteristics and macroeconomic variables could be
simultaneously determined.  It is hard to think of a convincing instrument in such a
setting.  A full treatment of these issues will have to be left for future research and
different data sets.  Some reassurance in this respect can be obtained by running
regressions where only truly exogenous personal characteristics are included, such as age
and gender, and where all macroeconomic variables are entered with a lag.  Table 9
checks the outcome.  The substantive conclusions remain the same as in earlier tables.17
Another interesting issue is how well-being in a country is affected by the amount
of inequality.  Assume utility functions are concave.  Then it might be thought that
inequality must automatically reduce the average level of happiness.  We hope to tackle
this issue properly in future work, but one test was done on these data.  Provided that
income inequality depends negatively on welfare generosity (and we would expect that
government help for the poorest would reduce inequality), higher unemployment benefits
in a society should raise the happiness of lower income people relative to higher income
people.  Given concavity, the poor dislike their relative position more than rich people
like their own. As a test, therefore, we repeated all the regression specifications reported
in the earlier Table 3 but also included interactions of our measure of benefit generosity
with each of the income quartiles.  As expected, the results show a significantly positive
differential effect (at the 5 per cent level) of benefits on the happiness of the poor relative
to the rich.
                                                                                                                                                                            
The third term is the personal cost of falling unemployed. The first two terms sum to 1.91
whereas the third term equals 0.50.
17 We also experimented with regressions that included several lagged changes in GDP per capita.
In a specification that adds the second lagged change in GDP to the specification in column (6) in
Table 9, the coefficient on ∆GDP per capita (-1) equals 1.734 (standard error=0.575) and the
coefficient on ∆GDP per capita (-2) equals 0.238 (s.e.=0.574).
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VII.  Happiness Evidence on the Role of the Welfare State.
Tables 8 and 9 find that the coefficient on Benefits, our indicator of the generosity of
publicly provided unemployment insurance, is positively correlated with happiness levels
and is well-defined statistically.  Column (1) in Table 8 implies that individuals who live
in a country such as Ireland, where the replacement rate averaged 0.28 over the sample
period, would be willing to pay 214 dollars (US 1985) to live in a country with a more
generous welfare state such as France, where the replacement rate averaged 0.31.18  In
terms of Table 8’s column (6), which includes country-specific time trends and has a
well-defined coefficient on ∆GDP per capita, people seem to be willing to forego growth
rates of 2.5 per cent in order to see an improvement in the summary measure of the
parameters of the unemployment benefit system from the Irish level to the French level.
Such numbers should, however, probably be thought of as upper bounds on the correct
estimates, because the regressions cannot adjust for the need in an improved welfare state
for higher taxes.  It is worth recalling, however, that there are potential identification
problems in all macroeconomic analysis of this kind.  We require the social safety net
here to be uncorrelated with omitted variables in the happiness equation.19
Besides providing a way to assess the returns from a welfare state, the paper’s
approach can be used to shed light on the validity of one criticism of European-style
welfare states.  A number of economists have argued that generous welfare provision has
made life "too easy" for the unemployed, leading to a poor labour market performance in
a number of European countries. The average OECD-calculated benefit replacement rate
across the sample of countries rose from 0.31 to 0.35 over the period of our data.  The
strictness with which benefit rules were enforced, moreover, is believed by some
observers to have diminished.
We first approach this problem by partitioning the sample into employed and
unemployed workers, and estimating a similar set of regressions to those presented in
Table 8.  Columns (1) and (2) in Table 10 show that happiness and Benefits are positively
                                                          
18 Since (0.31-0.28)*1.0/0.00014=214 dollars.
19 The literature that can be used as a guide in the search for instruments in this context is small.
Di Tella and MacCulloch (1996a) presents some theory and evidence behind the determination of
unemployment benefits. See also the voting model of Wright (1986).
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correlated for both the unemployed and the employed sub-sample.  Moreover, the two
coefficients on the benefits variable, 1.25 and 1.44, are similar.  Hence an increase in the
generosity of unemployment benefits helps the well-being of the unemployed and
employed by a similar amount (perhaps because the employed know they may in the
future lose their jobs, and the jobless know they may find a job).  More formally, column
(3) of Table 10, which estimates the difference in the corresponding coefficient estimate
across the two sub-samples, is a test of the hypothesis that the welfare state made life too
easy for the unemployed (at least relative to the employed).  That hypothesis is not
supported by the data.  The reason is that the benefits variable enters the Gap equation –
where the ‘gap’ can be thought of as the difference in well-being between those with jobs
and those looking for a job – with a coefficient that is insignificantly different from zero.
Table 11 re-does the equations to check for robustness to country-specific time trends.
Further evidence comes from direct examination of the data on the life
satisfaction of employed and unemployed Europeans.  Figures 1 and 2 plot the raw
numbers.  As Figure 1 shows, there is no marked rise over time in the happiness of the
jobless compared to those in jobs.  Both series run roughly together over the years.
Figure 2, which is a plot of the gap itself, in fact reveals a slight widening of the
difference in well-being levels (though it is not statistically significant) between the two
groups.  These life satisfaction data seem to paint a clear picture.  It has not become
easier and less unpleasant, over this period, to be out of work in Europe.
VIII.  Conclusions
This paper shows that macroeconomic movements have strong effects on the happiness
of nations.  It also suggests a new way to measure the costs of business-cycle downturns.
We use psychological well-being data on a quarter of a million people across
twelve European countries and the United States.  The data come in the form of answers
to questions such as “How happy are you?” or “How satisfied are you with life as a
whole.”  Ordered probit equations are estimated.  Differences in people’s use of language
are viewed as a component of the error term.  Using normal regression techniques, the
paper starts by showing that happiness data have a stable structure.  Micro-econometric
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well-being equations take the same general form in 12 European countries and the US.
An estimated happiness equation is increasing in income – like the economist’s
traditional utility function.
Macroeconomics matters. People’s happiness answers en masse are strongly
correlated with movements in current and lagged Gross Domestic Product per capita.
This is the main finding of the paper.
An important conceptual issue is whether improvements in national income lead
to permanent or only temporary gains in national happiness.  In other words, is it the level
or change in GDP that influences well-being?  After an examination of a range of
specifications, we conclude that there is statistical support for both kinds of channel. The
persuasive evidence for a change-in-GDP effect upon a country’s happiness is consistent
with theories of adaptation.  It seems likely, therefore, that some of the well-being gains
from extra national income wear off over time.  Our conjecture is that there are strong
habituation effects, so that human beings get used to a rise in national income, but that
not all of the benefits of riches dissipate over time.  Future research, with longer runs of
data, will have to revisit that conjecture.20
Losses from recessions are large.  It is not just that GDP drops and that some
citizens lose their jobs.  On top of those costs to society, and after controlling for personal
characteristics of the respondents, year dummies, and country fixed-effects, we estimate
that individuals would need 200 extra dollars of annual income to compensate for a
typical U.S.-size recession.  In our sample, $200 is approximately 3 percent of per capita
GDP. This loss is over and above the actual fall in income in a recession.  One potential
interpretation is that, in an economic downturn, people suffer a fear-of-unemployment
effect.21  For those actually becoming unemployed, moreover, we conclude that falling
unemployed is as bad as losing approximately 3,800 dollars of income a year.  Standard
economics tends to ignore what appear to be important psychic costs of recessions.
The methods developed in the paper have other applications.  Economists who
analyze high European unemployment, for example, often claim that the problem lies
                                                          
20 It means that some explanation will have to be found for the negative trend in year dummies in
the happiness equations estimated here.
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with a growing generosity of the welfare state in these countries: benefits have made life
too easy for the unemployed.  Using well-being data, the paper tests this hypothesis.  It
does not find evidence to support it.
There are likely to be other ways in which the subject of macroeconomics can
harness the kind of subjective well-being data studied here.
                                                                                                                                                                            
21 Strictly speaking, our specifications imply that even unemployed people suffer a psychic or fear
cost as the unemployment rate rises.  One possible interpretation is that a higher unemployment
rate makes a jobless person feel he or she is less likely to find work quickly.
Table 1a
Life Satisfaction in Europe: 1975 to 1992
Marital StatusReported Life
Satisfaction All Unemployed Married Divorced
% % % %
Very satisfied 27.29 16.19 28.90 19.18
Fairly satisfied 53.72 44.70 53.85 51.80
Not very satisfied 14.19 25.52 12.98 20.90
Not at all satisfied   4.80 13.59   4.27   8.11









Very satisfied 26.81 27.75 22.80 24.98 28.07 33.07
Fairly satisfied 54.45 53.01 50.43 54.25 55.66 54.38
Not very satisfied 13.90 14.47 18.86 15.65 12.66   9.82
Not at all satisfied   4.84   4.77   7.92   5.11   3.61   2.73
Note: Based on 271,224 observations.  All numbers are expressed as a percentage.
Table 1b




          Married                     Divorced
% % % %
Very happy 32.66 17.75 39.54 19.70
Pretty happy 55.79 52.66 52.51 61.75










Very happy 31.95 33.29 24.07 29.46 34.80 40.78
Pretty happy 56.33 55.31 56.04 58.02 56.22 53.14
Not too happy 11.72 11.39 19.88 12.52   8.98   6.08
Note: Based on 26,668 observations.  All numbers are expressed as a percentage.
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Table 2
Life Satisfaction Equation for Europe, Ordered Probit: 1975 to 1992.
Dependent Variable: Reported Life Satisfaction Coefficient Standard Error
Unemployed -0.505 0.020






Age Squared 3.2e-4 1.3e-5
Income Quartile:
                            Second 0.143 0.011
  Third 0.259 0.013
  Fourth (highest) 0.397 0.017
Education to age:
                             15-18 years old 0.060 0.009
   ≥ 19 years old 0.134 0.013
                             Still Studying 0.159 0.022
Marital Status:
                          Married 0.156 0.010
                          Divorced -0.269 0.017
                          Separated -0.328 0.025
                          Widowed -0.145 0.013
Number of children:
                                1 -0.032 0.008
                                2 -0.042 0.010
                                ≥ 3 -0.094 0.016
Countries:











Notes: Number of Observations 271,224. Log-likelihood=-276,101. Chi2(50)=10,431. Cut1=-
1.67, Cut2=-0.80, Cut3=0.87. The regression includes year dummies from 1975 to 1992. The
base country is France. The exact question for the dependent variable is: “On the whole, are you
very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”
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Table 3
Happiness Equation for Europe, Ordered Probit: 1975 to 1986.
Dependent Variable: Reported Happiness Coefficient Standard Error
Unemployed -0.390 0.023






Age Squared 3.6e-4 1.9e-5
Income Quartile:
                            Second 0.131 0.014
  Third 0.259 0.017
  Fourth (highest) 0.378 0.019
Education to age:
                             15-18 years 0.025 0.012
   ≥ 19 years 0.076 0.019
Marital Status:
                          Married 0.249 0.017
                          Divorced -0.291 0.027
                          Separated -0.398 0.040
                          Widowed -0.197 0.021
Number of children:
                                1 -0.033 0.012
                                2 -0.041 0.016
                                ≥ 3 -0.111 0.027
Countries:











Notes: Number of Observations=103,990. Log-likelihood=-92,127. Chi2(42)=4,575. Cut1=-
1.21, Cut2=-0.59. The regression includes year dummies from 1975 to 1992. The base country
is France. The exact question for the dependent variable is: “Taking all things together, how




Happiness Equation for the United States, Ordered Probit: 1972 to 1994.
Dependent Variable:  Reported Happiness Coefficient Standard Error
Unemployed -0.379 0.041











Fourth (highest) 0.398 0.025
Education:
High School 0.091 0.019











≥ 3 -0.119 0.024
Notes: Number of Observations 26,668. Log-likelihood= -23941.869. Chi2(50)= 2269.64. Cut1=-
1.217, Cut2=-0.528. The regression includes year dummies from 1972 to 1994. The exact
question for the dependent variable is: “Taken all together, how would you say things are these
days Would you say you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”.
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Table 5a
Summary Statistics, 12 European Nations: 1975 to 1992.
Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Reported Life Satisfaction 271,224 2.035 0.778 0 3
GDP per capita (US$ 1985) 190 7,809 2,560 2,145 12,415
∆ GDP per capita 190 244 234 -968 902
Benefit replacement rate 190 0.302 0.167 0.003 0.631
Inflation rate 190 0.079 0.056 -0.007 0.245
Unemployment rate 190 0.086 0.037 0.006 0.211
Table 5b
Correlation Coefficients, 12 European Nations: 1975 to 1992.
Reported GDP per ∆ GDP Benefit Inflation
Life capita per capita replacement rate
Satisfaction (US$ '85) rate
Reported Life Satisfaction 1
GDP per capita (US$ '85) 0.209 1
∆ GDP per capita 0.056 0.278 1
Benefit replacement rate 0.281 0.471 0.111 1
Inflation rate -0.161 -0.659 -0.379 -0.521 1
Unemployment rate -0.023 -0.151 0.062 -0.016 -0.230
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Table 6: Life Satisfaction and GDP, Ordered Probit Regressions, Europe: 1975 to 1992.
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reported Life Satisfaction
GDP per capita 1.094 1.220
(0.335) (0.763)
GDP per capita (-1) 0.927 0.575
(0.357) (1.283)
GDP per capita (-2) 0.640* -0.875
(0.389) (0.870)
∆ GDP per capita 0.953
(0.719)
∆ GDP per capita (-1) 1.761
(0.780)
Personal Characteristics
Unemployed -0.502 -0.503 -0.504 -0.502 -0.505 -0.504
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Self employed 0.062 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.060
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Retired 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.067 0.068
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Home 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
School 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.012
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Male -0.067 -0.067 -0.066 -0.067 -0.066 -0.066
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared 3.1e-4 3.1e-4 3.2e-4 3.1e-4 3.2e-4 3.1e-4
(1.3e-5) (1.3e-5) (1.3e-5) (1.3e-5) (1.3e-5) (1.3e-5)
Income Quartile: Second 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.143 0.143
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
            Third 0.261 0.260 0.260 0.261 0.259 0.260
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
            Fourth (highest) 0.398 0.398 0.398 0.397 0.397 0.397
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Education to age: 15-18 years old 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
                             ≥ 19 years old 0.134 0.134 0.133 0.135 0.135 0.136
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Marital Status: Married 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
                        Divorced -0.269 -0.269 -0.269 -0.269 -0.269 -0.269
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
                        Separated -0.328 -0.328 -0.327 -0.329 -0.328 -0.329
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
                        Widowed -0.144 -0.144 -0.144 -0.144 -0.145 -0.145
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of children:  1 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
                                   2 -0.043 -0.042 -0.042 -0.042 -0.043 -0.042
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
                                  ≥ 3 -0.095 -0.094 -0.094 -0.095 -0.094 -0.094
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Specific Time Trends No No No No No No
Pseudo-R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Number of Observations 271,224 271,224 271,224 271,224 271,22 271,224
Notes: [1] Standard errors in parentheses. [2] Bold-face is significant at the 5 per cent level; * at 10 per cent level. [3] Cut
points (standard errors) are -0.70 (0.30), 0.18 (0.31), 1.84 (0.31) for reg. (1); -0.86 (0.32), 0.01 (0.32), 1.68 (0.32) for reg.
(2); -1.13 (0.34), -0.26 (0.34), 1.41 (0.34) for reg. (3); -0.84 (0.34), 0.04 (0.34), 1.70 (0.34) for reg. (4); -1.65 (0.07), -0.77
(0.07), 0.89 (0.07) for reg. (5); -1.63 (0.07), -0.76 (0.07), 0.91 (0.07) for reg. (6). [4] GDP is scaled by a factor of 10,000.
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Table 7
Life Satisfaction and GDP, with Country-Specific Time Trends,
Ordered Probit Regressions, Europe: 1975 to 1992.
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reported Life Satisfaction
GDP per capita 1.031 1.133*
(0.455) (0.626)
GDP per capita (-1) 0.301 0.654
(0.500) (0.888)
GDP per capita (-2) -0.801 -1.652
(0.492) (0.716)
∆ GDP per capita 1.390
(0.552)
∆ GDP per capita (-1) 1.920
(0.620)
Personal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
Number of Observations 271,224 271,224 271,224 271,224 271,224 271,224
Notes: [1] Standard errors in parentheses. [2] Bold-face is significant at the 5 per cent level; * at 10 per cent level.
[3] Cut points (standard errors) are -1.37 (0.43), -0.49 (0.43), 1.18 (0.43) for reg. (1); -1.01 (0.42), -0.13 (0.42), 1.54
(0.42) for reg. (2); -0.51 (0.42), 0.37 (0.42), 2.04 (0.42) for reg. (3); -0.69 (0.40), 0.19 (0.40), 1.86 (0.41) for reg. (4);
-0.96 (0.37), -0.08 (0.37), 1.59 (0.37) for reg. (5); -0.82 (0.30), 0.06 (0.30), 1.73 (0.30) for reg. (6). [4] GDP is
scaled by a factor of 10,000.
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Table 8
Life Satisfaction and Macroeconomic Variables, Ordered Probit Regressions,
Europe: 1975 to 1992.
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reported Life Satisfaction
GDP per capita 1.408 1.305* 1.132 1.020
(0.361) (0.784) (0.552) (0.668)
GDP per capita (-1) 0.576 0.628
(1.305) (0.890)
GDP per capita (-2) -0.561 -1.455
(0.842) (0.698)
GDP per capita 0.775 1.184
(0.725) (0.583)
Benefit replacement rate 1.027 1.026 0.665 0.883 0.854 0.769
(0.219) (0.223) (0.213) (0.363) (0.359) (0.372)
Unemployment rate -1.909 -1.845 -2.703 -1.291 -1.481 -1.954
(0.664) (0.675) (0.694) (0.823) (0.722) (0.673)
Inflation rate -0.994 -0.963 -0.780 -1.042* -0.804 -0.845
(0.464) (0.480) (0.470) (0.585) (0.601) (0.600)
Personal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Specific Time No No No Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09
Number of Observations 271,224 271,224 271,224 271,224 271,224 271,224
Notes: [1] Standard errors in parentheses. [2] Bold-face is significant at the 5 per cent level. * at 10 per cent level. [3]
Cut points (standard errors) are -0.31 (0.34), 0.57 (0.35), 2.24 (0.35) for reg. (1); -0.41 (0.37), 0.47 (0.38), 2.14 (0.38)
for reg. (2); -1.67 (0.12), -0.80 (0.12), 0.87 (0.12) for reg. (3); -2.39 (0.62), -1.51 (0.62), 0.16 (0.62) for reg. (4); -1.40




Life Satisfaction Regressions and Exogeneity, Ordered Probit Regresions,
Europe: 1975 to 1992.
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reported Life Satisfaction
GDP per capita (-1) 1.275 2.315 0.521 1.518
(0.361) (0.826) (0.503) (0.680)
GDP per capita (-2) -2.025 -1.471
(1.357) (0.957)
GDP per capita (-3)  0.987 -0.421
(0.805) (0.606)
 GDP per capita (-1) 1.608 1.771
(0.713) (0.549)
Benefit replacement rate (-1) 0.907 0.911 0.592 1.238 1.249 1.254
(0.235) (0.235) (0.217) (0.375) (0.384) (0.389)
Unemployment rate (-1) -1.659 -1.765 -2.426 -0.929 -1.314 -1.188*
(0.726) (0.688) (0.709) (0.746) (0.703) (0.637)
Inflation rate (-1) -0.718 -0.712 -0.550* -0.633* -0.417 -0.464
(0.313) (0.333) (0.322) (0.375) (0.372) (0.360)
Personal Characteristics
Male -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Squared 1.4e-4 1.4e-4 1.4e-4 1.4e-4 1.4e-4 1.4e-4
(1.2e-5) (1.2e-5) (1.2e-5) (1.2e-5) (1.1e-5) (1.2e-5)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Specific Time Trends No No No Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Number of Observations 271,224 271,224 271,224 271,224 271,224 271,224
Notes: [1] Standard errors in parentheses. [2] Bold-face is significant at the 5 per cent level. * at 10 per cent level. [3]
Cut points (standard errors) are -0.48 (0.36), 0.36 (0.36), 1.98 (0.37) for reg. (1); -0.48 (0.38), 0.36 (0.39), 1.99 (0.39)
for reg. (2); -1.69 (0.10), -0.85 (0.10), 0.77 (0.10) for reg. (3); -2.41 (0.53), -1.56 (0.53), 0.06 (0.53) for reg. (4); -1.70




Life Satisfaction of the Employed, Unemployed and the Well-being Gap,
Ordered Probit Regressions, Europe: 1975 to 1992.
Dependent Variable: Employed Unemployed The Gap Employed Unemployed The Gap
Reported Life Satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita 1.418 1.053* 0.208
(0.439) (0.614) (0.714)
∆ GDP per capita 1.028 0.991 0.084
(0.853) (1.110) (1.249)
Benefit replacement rate 1.248 1.438 -0.385 0.910 1.227 -0.480
(0.268) (0.408) (0.510) (0.247) (0.395) (0.497)
Unemployment rate -1.660 -3.046 1.788 -2.486 -3.573 1.573
(0.747) (1.096) (1.256) (0.778) (1.033) (1.177)
Inflation rate -1.388 -1.602 0.422 -1.117 -1.551* 0.634
(0.508) (0.809) (0.836) (0.506) (0.857) (0.871)
Personal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Specific Time Trends No No No No No No
Pseudo-R2 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.09
Number of Observations 136,570 12,493 149,063 136,570 12,493 149,063
Notes: [1] Standard errors in parentheses. [2] Bold-face is significant at the 5 per cent level. * at 10 per cent level. [3]
Cut points (standard errors) are -0.27 (0.42), 0.63 (0.43), 2.38 (0.43) for reg. (1); -0.58 (0.65), 0.31 (0.65), 1.70 (0.65)
for reg. (2); -0.33 (0.42), 0.56 (0.42), 2.28 (0.43) for reg. (3); -1.71 (0.13), -0.81 (0.13), 0.94 (0.13) for reg. (4); -1.58
(0.23), -0.69 (0.23), 0.70 (0.23) for reg. (5); -1.69 (0.13), -0.80 (0.13), 0.92 (0.13) for reg. (6). [4] GDP is scaled by a
factor of 10,000. [5] The Gap equations are derived by combining the samples of employed and unemployed people,
and then estimating a life satisfaction equation in which, as well as the usual microeconomic regressors, a set of
interaction terms are included.  These interact a dummy for being unemployed with each of the independent variables.
The reported coefficients, in columns 3 and 6, are the coefficients on those interaction terms.
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Table 11
Life Satisfaction Regressions by Employment Status, with Country-Specific
Time Trends, Ordered Probit Regressions, Europe: 1975 to 1992.
Dependent Variable: Employed Unemployed The Gap Employed Unemployed The Gap
Reported Life Satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita 1.394 2.473 -0.133
(0.642) (0.911) (0.999)
∆ GDP per capita 1.463 1.592 -0.294
(0.708) (1.061) (1.213)
Benefit replacement rate 1.068 1.403 -0.477 0.915 1.061 -0.253
(0.443) (0.536) (0.728) (0.442) (0.539) (0.719)
Unemployment rate -0.858 -2.233* 1.683 -1.709 -4.093 2.880
(0.969) (1.248) (1.415) (0.785) (1.058) (1.210)
Inflation rate -1.540 -1.498* 0.162 -1.295 -1.096 -0.035
(0.642) (0.845) (0.718) (0.658) (0.880) (0.746)
Personal Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Specific Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.10
Number of Observations 136,570 12,493 149,063 136,570 12,493 149,063
Notes: [1] Standard errors in parentheses. [2] Bold-face is significant at the 5 per cent level. * at 10 per cent level. [3] Cut
points (standard errors) are –2.76 (0.69), -1.86 (0.69), -0.11 (0.69) for reg. (1); -3.53 (1.15), -2.63 (1.15), -1.24 (1.15) for
reg. (2); -2.73 (0.68), -1.84 (0.68), -0.12 (0.68) for reg. (3); -1.70 (0.48), -0.80 (0.48), 0.95 (0.48) for reg. (4); -1.61




 Table A1: Life Satisfaction Equations in European Nations (Ordered Probits), 1975 to 1992.
Dependent Variable:
Reported Life Satisfaction


























































































































































































Log-likelihood -25968 -29619 -25881 -31872
Note: The regressions include country dummies and year dummies from 1975 to 1992.
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Table A1 (Cont’d): Life Satisfaction Equations in European Nations (Ordered Probits), 1975-92.
Dependent Variable:
Reported Life Satisfaction


























































































































































































Log-likelihood -25233 -24879 -22179 -7460
Note: The regressions include country dummies and year dummies from 1975 to 1992.
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Table A1 (Cont’d): Life Satisfaction Equations in European Nations (Ordered Probits): 1975-92.
Dependent Variable:
Reported Life Satisfaction


























































































































































































Log-likelihood -21029 -12324 -12082 -24879
Note: The regressions include country dummies and year dummies from 1975 to 1992.
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Table A2: Means and Standard Deviations for European Life Satisfaction Regression, 1975 to 1992
Dependent Variable: Mean Standard Deviation
Reported Life Satisfaction 3.035 0.778
Independent Variables:
Unemployed 0.046 0.210






Age Squared 2192 1662
Income Quartiles: Second 0.248 0.432
Third 0.256 0.436
Fourth (highest) 0.253 0.435
Education to age: 15-18 years old 0.390 0.488
≥ 19 years old 0.203 0.402




Number of children: 1 0.156 0.362
2 0.099 0.299
≥ 3 0.039 0.193
* Based on 271,224 observations
Table A3: Means and Standard Deviations for the U.S. Happiness Regression, 1972 to 1994.
Dependent Variable: Mean Standard Deviation
Reported Happiness 2.211 0.631
Independent Variables:
Unemployed 0.032 0.175







Age Squared 2280 1674
Income Quartiles: Second 0.240 0.427
Third 0.266 0.442
Fourth (highest) 0.266 0.442
Education: High School 0.523 0.500
Associate / Junior College 0.040 0.196
Bachelor’s 0.129 0.335
Graduate 0.058 0.233




Number of children: 1 0.158 0.365
2 0.244 0.430
≥ 3 0.329 0.470




 Life Satisfaction of the Employed Life Satisfaction of the Unemployed 





Figure 1: Average Life Satisfaction of Employed and Unemployed Europeans* (based on
a random sample of 271,224 individuals).
 
YEAR  





Figure 2: The Life Satisfaction Gap between Employed and Unemployed Europeans
with Trend Line Added (based on a random sample of 271,224 individuals).




The United States General Social Survey (1972-1994)
 The General Social Surveys have been conducted by the National Research
Center at the University of Chicago since 1972. Interviews have been undertaken during
February, March and April of 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982,
1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1994. There were no
surveys in 1979, 1981 and 1992. There were a total of 32380 completed interviews (1613
in 1972, 1504 in 1973, 1484 in 1974, 1490 in 1975, 1499 in 1976, 1530 in 1977, 1532 in
1978, 1468 in 1980, 1506 in 1982, 354 in 1982 black oversample, 1599 in 1983, 1473 in
1984, 1534 in 1985, 1470 in 1986, 1466 in 1987, 353 in 1987 black oversample, 1481 in
1988, 1537 in 1989, 1372 in 1990, 1517 in 1991, 1606 in 1993 and 2992 in 1994).
The Euro-Barometer Survey Series (1975-1992)
The Euro-Barometer Surveys were conducted by various research firms operated
within the European Community (E.C.) countries under the direction of the European
Commission. Either a nationwide multi-stage probability sample or a nationwide
stratified quota sample of persons aged 15 and over was selected in each of the E.C.
countries. The cumulative data file used contains 36 attitudinal, 21 demographic and 10
analysis variables selected from the Euro-Barometers, 3-38. Data for Belgium, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom were
available for the full sample period (1975-1992) whereas data were only available from
1981 to 1992 for Greece and from 1985 to 1992 for both Spain and Portugal.
Data Definitions
REPORTED LIFE SATISFACTION: The answer to the Euro-Barometer Survey question
that asks, "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied
or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?” (The small "Don't know" and "No
answer" categories are not studied here).
REPORTED HAPPINESS: The answer to the U.S. General Social Survey and Euro-
Barometer questions that ask, "Taken all together, how would you say things are
these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too
happy?” (Small "Don't know" and "No answer" categories are not studied here).
BENEFIT REPLACEMENT RATE: The OECD index of (pre-tax) replacement rates
(unemployment benefit entitlements divided by the corresponding wage. It
attempts to captures the situation of a representative or average individual.
Consequently, the unweighted mean of 18 numbers based on the following
scenarios is determined (1) three unemployment durations (for persons with a
long record of previous employment); the first year, the second and third years,
and the fourth and fifth years of employment (2) three family and income
situations: a single person, a married person with a dependent spouse, and a
married person with a spouse in work; and (3) two different levels of previous
earnings: average and two-thirds of average earnings (For further details see the
OECD Jobs Study (1994)). Since this index was calculated only for odd-
numbered years, for even-numbered years we made a linear interpolation.
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: The standardised unemployment rate from the CEP OECD
Data set.
INFLATION RATE: The inflation rate as measured by the rate of change in consumer
prices, from CEP OECD Data Set.
GDP PER CAPITA: Real GDP per capita at the price levels and exchange rates of 1985
(in U.S. dollars) from OECD National Accounts (1997).
∆GDP PER CAPITA:  GDP PER CAPITA minus GDP PER CAPITA (-1).
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